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Tape Recording Telephone Conversations-Is It Ethical
For Attorneys?
Charles W. Adams*
Technological advances and regulatory changes in recent years
have made it much easier to record telephone conversations. In the
past, equipment for tape recording telephone calls could be obtained
only from telephone companies and was not generally available to con-
sumers. Today telephone answering machines are in wide use and are
found in approximately twenty-eight percent of American households.1
Nearly one-half of the answering machines that are sold have a feature
for making a tape recording of both sides of a telephone conversation
without the knowledge of the other party to the conversation.2 As a
consequence, it is likely in this electronic age that large numbers of tele-
phone conversations are being recorded in secret.
Undoubtedly, many attorneys will be attracted to the idea of using
surreptitious tape recordings as an inexpensive and effective means of
preserving evidence for trial. In addition to making their own tape re-
cordings of conversations with witnesses and opposing counsel, some
attorneys might recommend that their clients secretly record telephone
conversations with potential adversaries or opposing witnesses. Once
the statements are on tape, they would be available for introduction at
trial either for substantive purposes as an admission of a party oppo-
nent3 or for impeachment purposes as a prior inconsistent statement of
a nonparty witness.4 Secret tape recordings might be especially useful
in divorce cases, where one spouse might make an unguarded admis-
sion to the other not knowing that the statement is being recorded so
that it could be played back at trial. The potential use of secret tape
recordings is not limited to divorce proceedings, of course, and might
find application in any case where the parties would have occasion to
communicate with each other over the telephone.
* Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. Bradsher, That Private Phone Conversation May Be on Tape, N.Y. Times, Dec.
17, 1989, at 1, col. - (nat'l ed.).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
4. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 613.
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This article addresses the ethics of attorneys' tape recording tele-
phone conversations or advising their clients to do so. The examination
is limited to tape recordings done by one of the parties to a telephone
conversation. Tape recording of a telephone conversation by someone
not a party to the conversation is wire tapping, which is prohibited
under federal law 5 and by state law 6 in many jurisdictions. However,
exemptions for tape recording by a party to the conversation are pro-
vided by federal law 7 and the laws of many states.8 Although the secret
tape recording of a telephone conversation by a party is unlawful in
some states," it is not unlawful in most jurisdictions. The fact that an
activity is lawful does not necessarily mean it is ethical, though, and
thus, the ethical considerations pertaining to the tape recording of tele-
phone conversations by attorneys need to be investigated.
The leading authority dealing with the ethics of tape recording
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (Supp. 1988) provides that a person who "intentionally in-
tercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or en-
deavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication" is subject to a fine or
imprisonment of not more than five years, or both.
6. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-30 (1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-303 (Supp. 1989); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (1988); OHIO REV, CODE ANN. § 2933.52 (Baldwin 1988); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 13, § 176.3 (Supp. 1989); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (Supp. 1988) provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting
under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication
where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception
unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing
any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of any State.
8. E.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 803.42(b)(3) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 18-6702(d) (1987); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 200.650 (Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A156A-4(d) (West 1985); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 13, § 176.4 (Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-35-21(c)(3) (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
23a-4(7)(b) (Supp. 1989).
9. Fourteen states have express provisions prohibiting the tape recording of tele-
phone conversations without the giving of notice or obtaining the consent of all parties
to them. CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West 1988); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335(a)(4)
(1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03 (West Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 14-2(a)(1)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4001(lXc) (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
322.1 (West Supp. 1990); MD CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(c)(3) (1989); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4) (West 1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539c
(West 1968); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2(I)(a)
(Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(1)(c) (1989); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5704(4)
(Purdon Supp. 1989); WASH REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.73.030(1)(a), (3) (1988).
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telephone conversations is ABA Formal Opinion 337.10 In a sweeping
opinion, the Ethics Committee of the American Bar Association ruled
that "secret recording by attorneys of conversations of any persons is
unethical even though legal under federal law."" It further noted that
prior Informal Opinions had prohibited an attorney's tape recording a
conversation with a client' 2 or with another party's attorney' 3 without
prior disclosure. Finding no basis for distinguishing recordings of these
persons from recordings of other persons, the Ethics Committee ex-
tended these prior Informal Opinions to the tape recording by attor-
neys of conversations with any persons.
The Ethics Committee based its Formal Opinion 337 on Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, entitled "A Lawyer Should
Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety"' 4 and DR 1-
102(A)(4), which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not . .. [e]ngage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."I 5
Similarly, the Informal Opinions upon which the Ethics Committee relied
were based on the former Canon 22 adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1908 which provided: "The conduct of the lawyer
before the Court and with other lawyers should be characterized by
candor and fairness."' 1 The rationale behind Formal Opinion 337, and
the Informal Opinions that were its predecessors, was that there is a
deceitful aspect to recording a conversation without disclosing the fact
of the recording to the other party. The usual reason for not disclosing
that a recording is being made is to catch the other party off guard in
the hopes that he will say things that he otherwise might not. While
secrecy may aid in bringing out candid, unguarded statements from the
other party, it also involves, as the various rules indicate, an element of
deception, or at least a lack of "candor and fairness" toward the other
party.
The Ethics Committee also pointed out that the Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) had issued an opinion requiring telephone
companies to file tariff regulations concerning the notification of all par-
10. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974).
11. Id. at 3 (original emphasis).
12. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1008
(1967).
13. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1009
(1967).
14. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1974).
15. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-101 (1974).
16. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 22 (1908).
1990] 173
The Journal of the Legal Profession
ties whenever a tape recording of a telephone conversation is being
made.17 In a proceeding that the FCC initiated to investigate the need
for regulation of telephone recording devices, the FCC decided to al-
low the devices to be used as long as their use was regulated to pro-
tect the right of privacy in telephone communications. The FCC deter-
mined that the appropriate means to protect this right of privacy was
through the giving of adequate notice to all parties that a telephone
conversation was being recorded through the use of a beep tone, or
an automatic tone-warning that would be repeated at regular intervals
throughout the telephone conversation. 18 The FCC opinion was di-
rected toward telephone companies, rather than the public-at-large
though, and required the telephone companies to include provisions in
the tariff regulations they file with the FCC requiring their customers to
use beep tones when tape recording telephone conversations. Al-
though neither the FCC nor the tariff regulations made it a criminal of-
fense to tape record a telephone conversation without using a beep
tone, a telephone company could discontinue telephone service to a
customer who violated its regulations. The Ethics Committee found that
there was, therefore, a conflict between the federal statute", providing
that the tape recording of a telephone conversation by a party was not
unlawful and the FCC opinion.20
Several state supreme courts in jurisdictions where the tape re-
cording of telephone conversations by parties is not unlawful have fol-
lowed Formal Opinion 337. 2 1 For example in People v. Smith,22 an at-
torney performed undercover work for the Colorado Bureau of
Investigation, which included making secret tape recordings of tele-
phone conversations with a former client who was being investigated
by the Bureau. The attorney, who had previously been a cocaine user,
purchased cocaine from the former client while wearing a body
17. In re Use of Recording Devices in Connection with Telephone Service, 11
F.C.C. 1033 (1947).
18. Id. at 1049-50, 1055.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (Supp. 1988).
20. Use of Recording Devices, 11 F.C.C. at 1033.
21. People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685, 687 (Colo. 1989); People v. Selby, 198 Colo.
386, 606 P.2d 45 (1979); J.C. Penney Co. v. Blush, 356 So. 2d 590 (Miss. 1978); In re
Anonymous Member of South Carolina Bar, 283 S.C. 369, 322 S.E.2d 667 (1984);
Cleckner v. Dale, 719 S.W.2d 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). See also Gunter v. Virginia
State Bar, 238 Va. 617, 385 S.E.2d 597 (1989) (attorney suspended from practice of law
for 30 days for advising client in divorce case to install a recording device on his home
telephone to record wife's telephone conversations with other persons).
22. 778 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1989).
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microphone so that the Bureau's agents could monitor their conversa-
tion. The former client was eventually arrested and pleaded guilty to
various felony drug charges. Before tape recording the telephone con-
versations with the former client, the attorney obtained assurances
from the state attorney general's office that this conduct would not
violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. Nevertheless, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court concluded that the tape recording violated DR 1-
102(A)(4),2 3 and ordered the attorney suspended from the practice of
law for two years. The Colorado Supreme Court held: "The undis-
closed use of a recording device necessarily involves elements of de-
ception and trickery which do not comport with the high standards of
candor and fairness to which all attorneys are bound.124
Similarly, the South Carolina Supreme Court. disciplined an attorney
for tape recording a telephone conversation in In re Anonymous Mem-
ber of the South Carolina Bar.25 In the course of the attorney's investi-
gating an auto accident for a client, he telephoned the other driver,
who was not represented by counsel. When asked his identity, the at-
torney said that he was the victim's cousin, but did not disclose that he
was an attorney or that he was tape recording the telephone conversa-
tion. Following Formal Opinion 337, the South Carolina Supreme Court
ruled: "We hold under these facts, an attorney is guilty of misconduct
under DR 1-204(A)(4) where a recording is made of a conversation with
an adversary or a potential adversary without the knowledge and con-
sent of all parties to the conversation.126 After finding misconduct, the
supreme court decided to impose only the comparatively lenient sanc-
tion of a private reprimand because it considered the issue of the pro-
priety of the attorney's conduct to present a novel question.
The Mississippi Supreme Court 27 and the Tennessee Court of Ap-
peals 28 also have stated in dicta that it is unethical for an attorney to
tape record secretly a telephone conversation to which he is a party.
Several federal court decisions have addressed the ethics of clan-
destine tape recordings by attorneys in the context of ruling on attor-
ney work product objections to production of tape recordings. In Par-
23. "A lawyer shall not ... [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (1980).
24. Smith, 778 P.2d at 687.
25. 283 S.C. 369, 322 S.E.2d 667 (1984).
26. Id. at __, 322 S.E.2d at 669.
27. J.C. Penney Co. v. Blush, 356 So. 2d 590, 594 (Miss. 1978).
28. Cleckner v. Dale, 719 S.W.2d 535, 537-38 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
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rott v. Wilson,29 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the trial court's order requiring production of tape recordings of tele-
phone conversations between an attorney and two witnesses which
the attorney had secretly made. The attorney objected to having to
produce the tapes on the ground that they were attorney work prod-
uct. The Eleventh Circuit noted that while the clandestine tape record-
ing of telephone conversations was not illegal under either federal or
the applicable state law, attorneys are governed by a higher standard
than mere legality. It pointed to Formal Opinion 337 as authority that
the taping was unethical. While the Eleventh Circuit expressly declined
to determine whether the tapes actually were work product material, 30
it held "whatever work product privilege might have existed was viti-
ated by counsel's clandestine recording of conversations with wit-
nesses." 31 Several other federal courts have followed the Parrott
holding.32
In addition to court rulings, bar association ethics opinions have
followed Formal Opinion 337 in finding secret tape recordings by attor-
neys to be ethical misconduct in the following states: Alabama, 33
Alaska, 34  Arizona,35  Colorado, 36  Hawaii, 37 Indiana,38  Kentucky,39
29. 707 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983).
30. Id. at 1272 n.21.
31. Id. at 1272 (footnotes omitted).
32. Chapman & Cole v. Itel Container Int'l B.V., 865 F.2d 676, 686 (5th Cir. 1989)
("[T]he clandestine taping of a telephone conversation implicitly waives the protection
of the work product doctrine because it violates the American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.") (alternative holding); Wilson v. Lamb, 125 F.R.D. 142,
143 (E.D. Ky. 1989) ("Based on the authority of Parrott, MOODY, and Haigh, [an attor-
ney's tape recording a meeting with a witness without the consent of the witness]
vitiates any work product privilege and the plaintiff is ordered to produce this tape for
the defendants.") (alternative holding) (footnotes omitted); Haigh v. Matsushita Elec.
Corp. of Am., 676 F. Supp. 1332, 1358-59 (E.D. Va. 1987) (work product privilege was
vitiated when attorney actively encouraged and affirmatively supported client's secretly
taping conversations).
33. Op. 84-22 of the Gen. Counsel, 45 ALA. LAW. 172 (1984), digested in Law.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 801, at 1073 (Aug. 6, 1986).
34. Op. 83-2, Alaska Bar Association, digested in Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) No. 801, at 1201 (June 8, 1983).
35. Op. 75-13 (attorney may secretly record conversation in exceptional circum-
stances, but may not do so to obtain impeachment evidence or inconsistent state-
ments), State Bar of Arizona, digested in 0. Maru, 1975 Supplement to the Digest of
Bar Association Ethics Opinions No. 7653 (1977); Op. 176A (Sept. 21, 1965), 6 ARIZ. B.).
28 (Dec. 1970), digested in 0. Maru, 1970 Supplement to the Digest of Bar Association
Ethics Opinions No. 5923 (1972).
36. Informal Op. 12-4-71, 1 COLO. LAW. 43 (Mar. 1972), digested in 0. Maru, 1975
[Vol. 15:171
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Louisiana,'40 Minnesota,41 Missouri,4 2 New York,43 North Dakota,4 4
Tennessee, 45 Texas,46 and Wisconsin.4 7 The only bar association to
have issued an ethics opinion that generally authorizes attorneys to rec-
ord conversations secretly is the Utah State Bar. 48
Supplement to the Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions No. 7998 (1977); Op. 22
(Jan. 26, 1962), Ethics Opinions of the Colorado Bar Association, digested in 0. Maru,
Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions No. 550 (1970).
37. Op. 30, Disciplinary Board of the Hawaii Supreme Court, digested in Law.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 901, at 2801 (Nov. 30, 1988).
38. Op. 2-1975 (Sept. 9, 1975), 19 RES GESTAE 234 (1975), digested in 0. Maru,
1975 Supplement to the Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions No. 8457 (1977).
39. Op. E-289 (1984), 1985 KY. BENCH & B. 51 (a lawyer in a civil action may not
suggest that his client secretly record telephone conversations), digested in Law. Man.
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 801, at 3910-11 (Sept. 1984); Op. E-279 (1984), 1984
KY. BENCH & B. 45 (criminal defense attorney may secretly record conversations with
witnesses), digested in Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 801, at 3909 (Jan.
23, 1985); Formal Op. E-98, Kentucky Bar Association, digested in 0. Maru, 1975 Sup-
plement to the Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions No. 8561 (1977).
40. Op. 158, 12 LA. B.J. 217 (1964), digested in 0. Maru, Digest of Bar Association
Ethics Opinions No. 1107 (1970).
41. Informal Op. 3 (July, 1986), 43 BENCH & B. MINN. 11 (1986), digested in Law.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 901, at 5025 (July 1986).
42. Informal Op. 7 (Jan. 13, 1978), MOBAR BULL. 8 (May 1978), digested in 0. Maru,
1980 Supplement to the Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions No. 11807 (1982).
43. Op. 328 (March 18, 1974), 46 N.Y. ST. B.J. 303 (1974), digested in 0. Maru,
1975 Supplement to the Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions No. 9088 (1977). See
also Op. 552, 1968 N.Y. Co. Y.B. 257 (ethics opinion of New York County Lawyers'
Association), digested in 0. Maru, 1970 Supplement to the Digest of Bar Association
Ethics Opinions No. 7068 (1972); Op. 836 (Nov. 6, 1958), 1959 N.Y.C.YB. 280 (ethics
opinion of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York), digested in 0. Maru,
Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions No. 2992 (1970).
44. Informal Op. 17 (July 14, 1975), State Bar Association of North Dakota, di-
gested in 0. Maru, 1980 Supplement to the Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions
No. 12506 (1982).
45. See Formal Op. 86-F-14(a) (July, 18, 1986), 23 TENN. B.I. 35 (Jan./Feb. 1987)
(prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys may make secret tape recordings), digested
in Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 901, at 8101 (July 18, 1986); Formal Op.
81-F-14 (July 23, 1981), Ethics Committee of the Board of Professional Responsibility of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee, digested in Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
No. 801, at 8103 (July 23, 1981).
46. Op. 392 (Feb. 1978) (overruling Opinion No. 84), 41 TEX. B.J. 580 (1978), di-
gested in 0. Maru, 1980 Supplement to the Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions
No. 12750 (1982).
47. Op. 75-3, 48 WIs. B. BULL. 61 (1975), digested in 0. Maru, 1975 Supplement to
the Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions No. 10183 (1977).
48. Op. 90 (undated), Ethics Comm. of the Utah State Bar, digested in Law. Man.
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A lawyer should not be allowed to circumvent an ethical prohibi-
tion by having another person engage in the prohibited activity for him.
Thus, it would seem that if it is improper for an attorney to tape record
a telephone conversation secretly, it is equally improper for him to sug-
gest that his clients do the tape recording themselves. 49 On the other
hand, it should be permissible for an attorney to advise a client that the
client's tape recording of a telephone conversation would not violate
either federal or state law.50 An attorney also should be allowed to use
a secret tape recording made by a client, if the attorney did not assist
or advise the client in connection with the recording.51 Distinguishing
between an attorney's passive acquiescence in a client's making secret
tapes and his actively encouraging the taping may be difficult in particu-
lar circumstances.52 Therefore, in a close case, a prudent attorney
should err on the side of caution and advise his client against the tap-
ing, if the attorney believes that it would be unethical for him to do the
taping himself.
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 901, at 8502 (Mar. 3, 1975).
49. Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 676 F. Supp. 1332, 1358 (E.D. Va.
1987) (an attorney's directing his client to engage in behavior that would be improper
for the attorney "would clearly be improper"); H.L. Hayden Co. of New York v. Sie-
mens Medical Sys., Inc., 108 F.R.D. 686, 690 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (dictum). Cf. Gunter v.
Virginia State Bar, 238 Va. 617, 385 S.E.2d 597 (1989) (attorney was disciplined for
advising client in divorce case to install a recording device on client's telephone to
record wife's conversations with other persons).
50. In Op. 515 (Dec. 27, 1979), 52 N.Y. ST. B.J. 162 (1980), digested in 0. Maru,
1980 Supplement to the Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions No. 12281 (1982), the
New York State Bar Association answered the following question in the affirmative:
"May a lawyer, in response to a client's request for advice, counsel a client concerning
the recording of a conversation between the client and a third party to whom no
notice is given?" The Opinion added the qualification that a lawyer might be required
also' to advise the client in particular circumstances that surreptitious tape recording
might be unfair to the rights of the person being recorded even though it was not
against the law. Opinion 515 was followed by the Kentucky Bar Association in Op. E-
289 (1984) (lawyer may respond to client inquiry with advice that secretly recording
telephone conversations is not unlawful), 1985 KENTUCKY BENCH & B. 51, digested in Law.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 801, at 3910-11 (lan. 23, 1985).
51. Cf. CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 151-52 (1987) (Reporter for the Rules explained in re-
sponse to a question at the February 1983 Midyear Meeting of the American Bar Asso-
ciation that "if evidence was obtained by another in violation of a third party's rights,
and the' lawyer had not participated in obtaining the evidence improperly, the Rule was
not intended to impose a sanction against the lawyer for using that evidence.").
52. See Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 676 F. Supp. 1332, 1360 (E.D. Va.
1987).
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Despite the extensive list of authorities condemning the making of
secret tape recordings by attorneys, it appears that secret tape record-
ings are not prohibited under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
that have now been adopted in most jurisdictions,5 3 as long as the re-
cording is not unlawful. The provisions in the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility upon which Formal Opinion 337 was based have been re-
placed by Rule 4.4, entitled "Respect for Rights of Third Persons,"
which provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means
that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or
burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that vio-
late the legal rights of such a person."5 4 The Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct have done away deliberately with the "appearance of
impropriety" standard in former Canon 9.55 Instead of this "appearance
of impropriety" standard, Rule 4.4 is concerned with whether the
methods used in obtaining evidence from third persons violate their
legal rights. 56 The United States Code and the statutes of many states57
expressly provide that it is not unlawful for a party to a telephone con-
versation to tape record it surreptitiously. Accordingly, an attorney's se-
cret tape recording of a telephone conversation with another person
does not violate that person's legal rights in most states, and presuma-
bly is not proscribed under Rule 4.4. Of course, an attorney's making a
surreptitious tape recording would be unethical in those jurisdictions58
where it is prohibited by law.
53. The Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct (ABA/BNA) lists 36 states that
have adopted the Model Rules. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 01, at 3
(Dec. 19, 1990).
54. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 4.4 (1974) (emphasis added).
55. G, HAZARD & W. HOLDES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 123 (appearance of impropriety
standard "is too vague for fair application, and was accordingly dropped from the
Model Rules"), 176.1 ("The Model Rules avoid the Canon 9 expression 'appearance of
impropriety,' because it is too vague a standard for discipline.") (1989); C. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.1:4 (1986) ("The framers of the 1983 Model Rules plainly meant
to abandon [the appearance of impropriety standard in Canon 9] as an independently
operating standard."). See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment
(criticizing appearance of impropriety standard in the context of vicarious disqualifica-
tion of a lawyer who changes law firms because it requires subjective assessments and
it is too vague).
56. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 12.4.4 (1986) states: "The limitation of the
prohibition in 1983 Model Rule 4.4 against methods of obtaining evidence that violate
legal rights of third person is inconsistent with the approach of Opinion 337 and should
serve to overrule it."
57. See supra notes 7 and 8.
58. See supra note 9.
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Concluding that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit
secret tape recording by attorneys raises serious concerns. Although
the tape recording of a telephone conversation may be viewed as
merely a more modern and accurate means to preserve the conversa-
tion than using one's memory or taking notes, it may be unfair to the
person who is being recorded, because it is contrary to his reasonable
expectations.59 While a party to a telephone conversation would ex-
pect that the other party would remember the conversation or take
notes, he may be surprised by the recording. Naturally, as tape record-
ing becomes more widespread, these expectations will have to be ad-
justed, but the changes in expectations are likely to produce undesir-
able consequences. The recognition that a telephone conversation with
opposing counsel may be recorded is apt to contribute to a possibly
already elevated level of suspicion between counsel; chill candid discus-
sion; and lead to greater posturing. Also, allowing surreptitious tape re-
cording of conversations between attorneys might diminish the spirit of
camaraderie that exists within the Bar and make the practice of law less
enjoyable. In addition, the public's awareness that attorneys are al-
lowed to tape record telephone conversations with witnesses secretly
and advise their clients to do likewise may tarnish the profession's
image.
Although these are serious policy considerations, they would seem
to have been resolved by the federal and state legislation providing
that secret tape recording by parties is not unlawful and by the adop-
tion in most jurisdictions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which have abandoned the "appearance of impropriety" standard for
attorneys. Nevertheless, there is considerable uncertainty in this area
due to precedent from many jurisdictions to the contrary and the fact
that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not address the sub-
ject of secret tape recording directly. Thus, it would be helpful if the
state supreme courts and bar associations would issue new opinions to
provide authoritative guidance to attorneys on this troublesome
subject.
59. See Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping & Eavesdropping: Sur-
reptitious Monitoring With the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 189, 214-21 (1968) (discussing arguments against surreptitious monitoring).
[Vol. 15:171
